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for the person whose rights were violated by a federal officer and against
whom no criminal charges had been preferred.
The Court thus concluded that absent an explicit congressional
mandate to the contrary, Webster Bivens was entitled to redress his
injury through a particular remedial mechanism available in the federal
courts, namely money damages. Thus, twenty-five years after the Court
first addressed itself to this question in Bell, the Court ruled that the
violation of fourth amendment rights by a federal agent acting under
color of federal authority states a federal claim for money damages upon
which relief may be granted.1
4
JOSEPH P. KLOCK, JR.
MANDATORY REFERENDUM AND APPROVAL FOR
LOW-RENT HOUSING PROJECTS: A DENIAL OF
EQUAL PROTECTION?
The United States Housing Act of 19371 established a federal hous-
ing agency authorized to offer aid in the form of loans and grants to
state agencies for slum clearance and low-rent housing projects. Califor-
nia was one of many states to take advantage of the Federal Housing
Act through the creation of local agencies.' However, two of California's
local agencies were prohibited from applying for funds8 under the federal
act by operation of a California constitutional provision4 requiring ap-
34. Apart from the practical problem of finding a jury that will award money against
federal officers while engaged in their official capacities, a more serious problem may face
Webster Bivens on remand, namely the defense of immunity from prosecution. In response
to the federal district court's ruling that it would bar the action (Bivens, 276 F. Supp. at
15), Petitioner argued extensively in his brief that the sovereign immunity defense ought not
to be permitted. However, the Supreme Court noted the Second Circuit had not ruled on the
point and declined to consider it.
In 1946, the Court in Bell reversed a district court for dismissing a fourth amendment
damage claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court did not, however, determine
whether such a claim was actionable because that point was not before the Court. On
remand, the lower court dutifully accepted jurisdiction, but dismissed the cause on the
grounds that an actionable claim had not been presented.
Twenty-five years later, the Bivens Court has advanced the argument begun in Bell,
and ruled that such a claim is actionable. The Court, however, failed to address itself to the
defense of immunity because, like Bell, the issue was not before it. Whether Webster Bivens
will get his day in court and a remedy for his injuries is yet to be seen.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970).
2. See CAL,. HEALTH AND SAFErY CODE § 34240 (West 1970).
3. This occurred twice in San Mateo County in 1966 and once in Santa Clara County
in 1968.
4. CAL. CONST. art. XXXIV, § 1 provides in pertinent part:
No low rent housing project shall hereafter be developed, constructed, or acquired
in any manner by any state public body until, a majority of the qualified electors
of the city, town or county, as the case may be, in which it is proposed to develop,
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proval of all low-rent housing projects by mandatory referenda.' Suits
were brought in federal district court' by parties, predominantly black,
who had low incomes and who were eligible for public housing. The
parties were denied the availability of public housing because the two
agencies were prohibited from applying for funds to clear and build.
The plaintiffs alleged the California constitutional provision violated:
(1) the supremacy clause; (2) the privileges and immunities clause; and
(3) the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. On
motions for summary judgment and application for injunctive relief,
the three judge court held the provision violative of the equal protec-
tion clause and enjoined its enforcement. 7 On appeal,8 the Supreme Court
of the United States, held, reversed: The California constitutional pro-
vision requiring approval of all low-rent housing projects is not viola-
tive of federal constitutional rights. James v. Valtierra, 91 S. Ct. 1331
(1971). 9
The United States Supreme Court has frequently reiterated that the
purpose of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution1"
is "to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimi-
nation. . . ."I' This basic concept emanates from the Slaughter House
Case.2 The Court has no less fervently applied the fourteenth amend-
ment where the "petitioners ... have been denied rights of ownership or
occupancy enjoyed as a matter of course by other citizens of different
race or color."' 8 It is well settled that such racial classifications must be
construct, or acquire the same, voting upon such issue, approve such project by
voting in favor thereof at an election to be held for that purpose, or at any general
or special election.
5. California is one of some twenty-two states that instituted the initiative and refer-
endum as direct legislative devices during the progressive reform programs of the early
1900's. See Fordham and Russell, The Initiative and Referendum in Ohio, 11 OrIo ST. L.J.
495 (1950) for a complete listing; Comment, The Scope of the Initiative and Referendum
in California, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1717 (1966) for a comprehensive study on the California
Initiative and Referendum.
6. Valtierra v. Housing Authority and Hayes v. Housing Authority were consolidated
for decision, 313 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
7. Id.
8. The Court noted probable jurisdiction of two appeals taken from the judgment, one
by the San Jose City Council and the other by a single member of the council in James v.
Valtierra, 91 S. Ct. 1331, 1333 (1971).
9. Justice Black wrote the majority opinion for the Court. Justice Marshall wrote the
dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
11. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967); See also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339 (1879).
12. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
13. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
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scrutinized more carefully 14 and that they must bear "a far heavier bur-
den of justification" than other similar classifications. 5
In Hunter v. Erickson, the Court found "an explicitly racial classi-
fication which treated racial housing matters differently from other racial
and housing issues."'" In Hunter, a city charter amendment prohibited
enactment of any ordinance dealing with racial, religious, or ancestral
discrimination in housing without approval of a majority of the voters.'
The city's characterization of the amendment as a public decision to
move slowly in the area of race relations was held insufficient to justify
the "real, substantial, and invidious denial of the equal protection of the
laws."' 8 However, where a referendum seeks a consensus on a question
of broad legislative policy rather than a consensus on a specific legisla-
tive act, the rule of Hunter v. Erickson has been distinguished. 9
The Hunter principle has been applied at the federal level only to
instances of explicit racial classification which are created "whenever
[the state] differentiates between the treatment of problems involving
racial matters and that afforded other problems in the same area. "20
The Court has expanded the equal protection concept to eliminate
racial discrimination, even when it is clothed in a seemingly neutral
statute. As early as 1960, the Court in Gomillion v. Lightfoot2' found
that an otherwise lawful redrawing of the city's boundaries became
unlawful when done to accomplish an exclusion of most of the black
voters from certain electoral districts.
In Reitman v. Mulkey,2" the Court adopted a "three factor test" to
determine the question of racial discrimination in housing matters
through the use of a neutral provision. In that case, a California consti-
tutional provision 21 limiting the state's power to infringe upon the ab-
14. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) ; Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1964).
15. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 194 (1964).
16. 393 U.S. 385, 389 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Hunter].
17. The Akron City Charter § 137 has been amended to provide:
Any ordinance enacted by the Council of the City of Akron which regulates the
use, sale, advertisement, transfer, listing assignment, lease, sublease or financing of
real property of any kind or of any interest therein on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin or ancestry must first be approved by a majority of the
electors voting on the question at a regular or general election before said ordinance
shall be effective. Any such ordinance in effect at the time of the adoption of this
section shall cease to be effective until approved by the electors as provided herein.
18. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393' (1969).
19. Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City, 314 F. Supp. 967
(N.D.. Cal. 1970) where California's general referendum statute was upheld when invoked
by community opponents to block a zoning variance necessary for the building of a federally
funded low income project.
20. Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710, 718 (W.D.N.Y. 1970).
21. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
22. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
23. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26 provided In part:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge,
directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease
or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rentsuch
property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.
[Vol. xxv
CASES NOTED
solute right of a person to dispose of his real estate was invalidated on the
basis of (1) the historical context and the conditions which existed
prior to its enactment, (2) its immediate objective, that is, its immedi-
ate design and intent, and (3) its ultimate effect.24 The intent and effect
of the provision was to repeal existing anti-discriminatory legislation and
prohibit re-enactment of similar legislation. The effect of the Reitman
decision in the federal district courts was that the courts considered the
actual impact upon minority groups as controlling even though the law
might appear neutral on its face.25
Structural limitations placed upon the political power of minority
groups, as a new standard of equal protection developed by the Court in
Hunter,20 has been rejected by the Court in the principal case.2 7 The
formulation of the new standard required going outside the factual situ-
ation of the case.28 Some authors had already observed that a new trend
was indicated by cases where majority groups attempted to stymie minor-
ity efforts to obtain favorable legislation.29
The rejection of the standard in the case noted herein precludes the
possibility of further expansion of the equal protection doctrine to effec-
tively curb the more subtle varieties of discrimination. The social effect
of the instant case was not only to deny the benefits of low-cost housing
to the low income group, including many Blacks, but also to retain the
instrument that caused that result. This is not to say that the tools to
invalidate a discriminatory referendum law are no longer available.
If the civil rights advocate were to construe the decision in the in-
24. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373 (1967). For a discussion of equal protection
and Proposition 14, see Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HAlv. L. REV. 69, 82
(1967) where it was said:
The rule which I would propose, then, as a basis for the Reitman decision, is that
where a racial group is in a political duel with those who would explicitly dis-
criminate against it as a racial group, and where the regulatory action the racial
group wants is of full and undoubted federal constitutionality, the state may not
place in the way of the racial minority's attaining its political goal any barriers
which, within the state's political system taken as a whole, are especially difficult of
surmounting, by comparison with those barriers that normally stand in the way of
those who wish to use political processes to get what they want.
25. Otey v. Common Council, 281 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Wis. 1968). Here, a proposed
resolution prohibiting enactment of any ordinance restricting the absolute right of owners
to dispose of their property in effect denied Negro residents living in segregated housing the
right to occupy other housing. In Keyes v. School Dist. 313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1970)
repeal of a board program denied Negroes the relief from segregated programs.
26. 393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969), where JJ. Harlan and Stewart concurring noted that
[where] a statute may have the clear purpose of making it more difficult for racial
and religious minorities to further their political aims . . . such a law cannot be
permitted to stand ....
In so doing, they were in effect developing further the notion of structural limitations as a
standard.
27. James v. Valtierra, 91 S. Ct. 1333, 1334 (1971), where the Court said,
Under any such holding, [referring to the holding in Hunter] presumably a State
would not be able to require referendums on any subject unless referendums were
required on all, because they would always disadvantage some group.
28. See Note, 47 Tax. L. REv. 1454 (1969).
29. Id.
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stant case as a rejection of explicit and implicit racial classifications as
standards to invalidate state action on equal protection grounds, he
would not be entirely correct. The Court was clear in stating that the
facts of the principal case did not meet the requirements of either an
explicit or implicit racial classification.30 This clarity of expression by
the Court precludes misinterpretating this decision as a justification for
continued enforcement of existing law which would otherwise be uncon-
stitutional or interpreting the instant case as a license to frame laws that
perpetuate the ghetto.31
GARY S. SORTOR
SUPREME COURT DECLINES ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
IN LAKE ERIE POLLUTION CASE
As water pollution problems continue to mount, citizens and states
are seeking effective remedies. The State of Ohio sought to invoke the
original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court in a complaint
praying for an injunction against three non-resident chemical companies,'
located in Michigan and Canada, which had allegedly created a public
nuisance by dumping poisonous mercury into Lake Erie and its tribu-
taries. The Supreme Court held, Ohio's motion for leave to file a bill of
complaint denied. Discretionary original jurisdiction was declined be-
cause the issues were bottomed on local nuisance principles involving no
federal law. Furthermore, the majority of eight reasoned that even with
the aid of a court appointed special master, they would be ill equipped
to act as a trial court. Several competent governmental agencies were
already involved in the problem of the pollution of Lake Erie, and, if
Ohio still wishes to seek injunctive relief and damages, Ohio courts can
obtain jurisdiction.' Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 91 S. Ct. 1005
(1971).
30. James v. Valtierra, 91 S. Ct. 1331, 1333 (1971), where the Court noted that Califor-
nia's article XXXIV does not rest on "distinctions based on race . . . [and that the record]
.. . would not support any claim that a law seemingly neutral on its face is in fact aimed
at a racial minority."
31. By this point in history it should be obvious that discrimination is a major cause
of the problems facing ghetto inhabitants. See Comment, Decent Housing as a Constitutional-
Right, 42 U.S.C. § 1893 Poor People's Remedy for Deprivation, 14 How. L.J. 338 (1968);
Comment, Tenant Interest Representation: Proposal for a National Tenants' Association, 47
T.x. L. Rav. 1160 (1969).
1. The defendant companies were Wyandotte Chemicals Corporation, Dow Chemical
Company, and Dow Chemical Company of Canada, Ltd.
2. Justice Douglas filed a lone dissent, arguing a special master with the aid of a panel
of scientific advisors could overcome the difficulties presented by the complex technical
facts. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 91 S. Ct. 1005, 1013-17 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Wyandotte].
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